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The ' situation,' already described by some as the absolute
of a certain conspicuous group of thinkers, is in general taking
such an important part in current philosophical discussion that to
an outsider philosophy must seem very like to an employment
bureau, if it does not appear at last to have become an intelli-
gence office. Undoubtedly, too, the very commonplaceness or
the plebeian character of the term is one of the most serviceable
and hopeful tendencies of current thinking. In the present
paper, then, only falling into line with so many others who
have written and spoken, I would discuss, let me not be so bold
or broad as to say advertise, four peculiarly interesting situa-
tions and their induced attitudes ; namely, the moral situation,
the artistic, the practical and the natural, and their four atti-
tudes, respectively the ethical, the esthetic, the intellectual or
cognitional, and the spiritual.
The situation, to begin with, whatever specific variations it
may have, in general has its rise, which is to say also gets its
widest meaning, in the fact that structure necessarily implies
function. Back of this fact, then, I do not propose to go at the
present writing. But, this admitted, another is immediately
manifest. Function necessarily implies conflict. The conflict,
moreover, which is the general situation, is between (i) an exist-
ing structure, describable either as the body of the individual
agent's habits or as the established social environment, the body
of the social institutions, to which just through his habits the
individual is, as if conventionally or traditionally or unreflec-
tively, always a part, and (2) the natural environment as dis-
tinct from the social or definitely and humanly organized
environment. In other words the conflict is between man with
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his life set to certain norms and nature; between ' second
nature' and first nature; between the formal reason and sensa-
tion, or the legislative will and impulse. Also it is between
one organization and another organization, the latter usually if
not invariably being more inclusive than the former and neces-
sarily rising into conflict with the former whenever, to use an
annoying but concise and pertinent term, i t ' functions' in any
way. And, just once more, in order to avoid the serious mis-
take of even a suspicion that the ' natural environment,' here
mentioned, is external to what is human, let me say of the
conflict that it is describable also as being between the formal
or structural in personal experience and the vital, even the most
distinctively personal, in personal experience. Thus, there is
a sense, important to a true understanding of what is here
meant, in which the characteristically personal and the natural
are identical or synonymous. Both the personal and the natural
are always coming into conflict with the definite and formal,
that is, the structural, in life or experience. The structural is not
distinctively personal or natural; on the contrary it is ' factional'
or socially corporate.1 Accordingly, on the assumption of this
identity of the personal and the natural, the situation, or its
conflict, must be due not less to personal initiative than to any
of the processes of mere ' natural selection' and of course too the
conflict can never be with an external nature. Indeed, if the
conflict could be with an external nature, then structure simply
could not imply function.
So we see that the characteristic condition of the situation in
general is conflict and we see too, although the foregoing state-
ment •has been very brief, the origin and the nature of this con-
flict. With this preliminary view, therefore, I turn now to my
special task. I would show how, to the end of solving its
conflict, which always is as specific and concrete in its terms
and issue as the inducing structure is itself definite in char-
acter, the situation develops through the following principal
moments.
1
 See an article : ' The Personal and the Factional (or formal or structural)
in the Life of Society,' in The Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific
Methods^, June 22, 1905.
IMPORTANT SITUATIONS AND THEIR ATTITUDES. 39
I. THE MORAL SITUATION.
The first moment is naturally that of a presumed sufficiency
of the subject's or agent's existing structure or, as the terms are
here used, of the formally human. The definite habits or the
social institutions are taken and are asserted, not only as quite
equal to the presented and confronted emergency, but also as
possessing intrinsic worth and normative or structural finality,
and the natural, in the sense of that which is formally external
to these habits or institutions, is an object only of an unreason-
ing fear. The natural is feared, blindly feared, just because it
is at once quite real and yet external at least to the formal
reason, to the reason of the structure-bound human.
So I view the first moment in the development of the situ-
ation and it seems to me to present specifically the moral situ-
ation. Not, of course, that morality is confined to conditions
such as these, but these are the characteristic conditions of the
situation as moral. These distinguish the moral situation from
other defined situations. In a sense, certainly important, all
situations are moral, as also they are all artistic or practical,
or natural, but this is only to say, in so many words, that the
specific conditions which make distinct situations are themselves
in their way functional as well as structural, and so are general
to development while being at the same time particular and
definable. Functionally any moment or situation, any struc-
ture must comprise all others.
Possibly the peculiarly moral character of this first distinct
moment is best seen in what my account has certainly, although
not openly stated, namely, in the conceit of the freedom of the
will. The ' free will' is simply a name for the power of the
agent to fulfil and exemplify the structural adequacy. Accord-
ingly, to use now this name, the conceit and practice of a ' free
will' and the accompanying unreasoning fear of what is external
to this freedom, a fear which may often take the form of bravado,
of what can be only an asserted indifference to danger, are the
determining factors of the moral situation.
But this, somebody will at once object, makes the moral and
the legal identical, and such an identity every reflective man
must promptly and emphatically resent. At once I grant that
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the moral and the legal are here made identical. I grant also
that reflection must separate them. But it is to be said, also
promptly and emphatically, that no situation as such is itself
reflective. Situations are not attitudes, although they are
always springing from attitudes and are also constantly in-
duced by them. Situations, as said before, are structural in so
far as definable at all, and the moral situation is in consequence
determined by the formal law. But situations, being also func-
tional, induce attitudes, and in the particular case at hand the
moral situation induces the ethical attitude. The very differ-
ence between these terms, even as they are widely used, tells
the story. The ethical is the moral, just by dint of the given
legal structure becoming active or functioning, made reflective
in an attitude. Again, any induced attitude involves a gener-
alization and idealization of those formal conditions which make
the inducing situation, and, although, as we shall see, the attitude
itself must make a situation, it should never be confused with
the particular situation whose functioning has given it rise.
Thus the functional nature of a structure, which here and now
means specifically those positive conditions that formally deter-
mine the moral situation, makes certain a movement out of
formal bondage to those conditions into a state of only mediate
dependence on them. They become only means to some rela-
tively undetermined end. They are made mediately rather
than immediately, ideally rather than materially, spiritually
rather than literally significant. And thereupon the moral sit-
uation gives way to the ethical attitude, and by the same token
morality is saved at least from a positive, uncompromising
legalism.
But not from legalism altogether. The ethical attitude is
still characteristically legalistic; in terms, however, not of the
positive law, but of ' duty,' ' conscience,' or the • moral ideal,'
which is only an abstraction of its spirit or general functional
value, from the positive, formal law. The ethical attitude, in-
duced, as was said, by the functional character of the moral sit-
uation, asserts the existing structural formalism, the manifest
legalism, to be worth cultivating, and a cultivated legalism must
always value law as a general principle above law as a visible
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program, the program becoming henceforth only instrumental
to the unseen principle. Lawfulness, in short, rather than the
specific law or structure, is the concern of the ethical attitude.
How often ethics is called normative, and surely its normative
character is nothing more nor less than its abstract legalism.
Further, the ethical attitude, just because, at least in spirit,
still legalistic, is also in another respect like its inducing situa-
tion. Although not dogmatically indifferent to nature nor quite
blindly fearful of her, it is nevertheless humanly conceited or
anthropocentric. The principle of law is always more hospitable
than a legal program; a structure in use is more widely sym-
pathetic than a structure just in statu quo; but the ethical atti-
tude still sees no positive worth in nature except as she is
humanly, or humanely, disposed. So to speak the spirit of the
fear of her still remains, as if to keep its congenial company
with the surviving, albeit only spiritual or functional legalism.
Fear become a spirit loses much of its dread. Law become a
principle loses much of its vigor. In a word, the normative,
ethical attitude must mean an important modification in the
actual situation. Ethical, as distinct from social or political
legalism, by its very idealism, which is to say by its devotion to
the spirit of law and its feeling only of the spirit of fear, makes
man actively hospitable towards the organization of nature, with
which morally he was in such dire conflict, and in doing this it
induces, or initiates, the artistic situation. The ethical attitude
put in practice is the peculiar life of art.
II. T H E ARTISTIC SITUATION.
So I pass to the second moment in the development of the
general situation, and this I would call, not the moment of as-
sumed and asserted human sufficiency, in which nature is an
object of blind fear, but the moment of human condescension,
assumed and asserted, towards the natural, towards nature's
law, structure or organization. This, too, as already said, is
the artistic situation. Art, let it be kept in mind, is character-
istically a situation, not an attitude. It is just a living up to a
humanly sympathetic nature and in just so far it actually is the
practice of what the ethical attitude may be said to preach.
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Once more, though I may repeat myself too much, it is, not the
moral, which is politically legalistic, but the ethical, which is
functionally, spiritually or personally legalistic, rendered incar-
nate, and as having such character it shows man actually in a
truce with nature. In art the human is seen actively to have
assumed a relation of equilibrium, necessarily more or less un-
stable, or of something very like an armed neutrality, between
itself, its structure, the norms of its life, and nature's structure.
Actively man moulds nature to his conceits. He makes her
glorify his image. In her life, in her powers and processes, he
realizes, or presumes to realize, only a deeper and fuller expres-
sion of himself. Art is thus, like morality, anthropocentric,
but it is man big with nature. It is the little human swelling
with the big natural, and as so conditioned it is what we call
poetic or creative, all its activities being informed with analogies
of the natural to the human and embodying, although never
without a violence that only the poetic imagination can have
made possible, nature's metaphors of the human. The neces-
sary violence, too, imparts to art as strong a sense of comedy as
of tragedy, as is shown in the readiness with which we laugh or
weep whenever we see the little human swollen with the big
natural. Simply in art, always as comic as tragic, man ap-
pears, not as teaching or seeking ideally, but as actually prac-
ticing a legalism that has lost the rigor of the formal law and a
fear of nature that is tempered by a very real sense of humor.
But here comes an objector. I am accused of narrowing
beauty, which is the recognized goal of art, to conditions that
require accord, if not literal and prosaic, at least metaphorical,
with the positive structure of the human agent, just as before I
seemed to identify morality with legality. In a word, I seem to
have left no room for objective or natural beauty. To the
present objector, however, I have to make just the answer
made before. A situation is not an attitude, although it always
induces one. The artistic situation, as its structure becomes
function, induces the esthetic attitude, by which the very con-
ditions making the life of art are idealized. Thus, for the
esthetic attitude, man is not, as in art, the determining center.
He is the observer indeed, but only the passive observer. His
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structure, losing its character of a sole measure for all other
structures or for the structure of nature as a whole, becomes but
one among the others, any one of which may be the center from
which a judgment is passed. True, for the esthetic attitude, all
structures, or all measures, by which nature, so to speak, is thus
made to measure or judge herself, are as if sensitively human,
but this only shows how humanly passive the esthetic attitude
is, how for it nature, not man, is the artist. The characteristic
object, therefore, of the esthetic attitude truly is beauty, sen-
sibly manifested and sensitively measured, but, instead of the
beauty of man to himself, as this is reflected in nature's meta-
phors just of his life, it is objectively natural beauty. The
metaphors are no longer exclusively human, but nature objec-
tively is just a sphere of metaphors, metaphor poised sensitively
against metaphor and calling deeply and passionately each to
each and through their poise and their passionate call she is
beautiful. She is beautiful to man; not, as in art, for him and
his structural conceits. For the esthetic attitude even the works
of human art must meet the demands of natural beauty in that
they.must accord, or sensitively sympathize, with what sur-
rounds them. The setting, or frame, of a work of art is thus
an important factor in its beauty.
But where now are the law and the fear? The law, and
with it, man's so-called freedom have been lost or merged, nay,
they have been fulfilled in the law and the freedom of nature
which an objective beauty reveals; and the fear is become awe.
Nature is no longer fearful, but awful or sublime. Awe is not
man fearing for his own safety; it is man sensitive to the fears
of the whole world and in that sensitiveness feeling the lawless
law of nature. Yet such terms as these and the seeming gran-
diloquence to which they lead may very easily obscure the
meaning here in my mind. The meaning would take a view
of life in its lowest as well as in its highest terms, in its simplest
as well as in its grandest expressions. A psychologist could
not be more minute or prosaic in his viewpoint than my mean-
ing is intended to be. Simply any structure, whatever its size
or its complexity, its significance or its dignity, being always
functional, must come to this sensitiveness, which we know,
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however grandiloquently, as awe towards the lawless law of
nature. What is sensation but structure meeting the violence
of nature. What is structure that nature is mindful of it.
But the esthetic attitude, induced, as has been shown by the
artistic situation and ideally sensitive, not merely to the unity of
man but also, as if actually feeling for them, to the unity of all
things with nature, leads man out of the artistic into the prac-
tical situation.
III. THE PRACTICAL SITUATION.
The practical situation, as the third moment to be consid-
ered, is the moment of the human structure, the whole body of
habits and institutions become — but the right phrase is hard to
find— merely a natural utility. Only, I would call it also, bor-
rowing a word from the political vocabulary of the day, a • float-
ing' utility. So does man again put into practice the preaching
of one of his attitudes. He comes actively to treat his formal
life just as his esthetic consciousness has already revealed it to
him, namely, as only mediate to an indeterminate nature, and,
as he does this, the last traces of his esthetic sensitiveness dis-
appear and the metaphors, human or objective, in which this
had found expression, become only dead metaphors. Man no
longer is even an interested observer of nature; he is just a
mechanical incident within her unpurposed movement.
In social evolution, where the practical situation in all its
phases is written large, the time is one of traditions and human
conceits and devotions of all sorts become purely conventional,
which is to say useful but not yet put in use, or treasured, as
money is treasured, but not yet actually invested, and accom-
panying these conditions there is also, as if the last defense of
the passing regime^ a blind fatalism. So long as this fatalism
remains blind the old structure of life can at least seem to sur-
vive, although the immediate vitality once belonging to it has
already gone.
Of course, further, when habits and institutions come, as
said above, to be a mere formal utility, a floating utility, the
personal in human life has virtually already separated itself
from the structural and this separation as a positive condition or
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status belongs to the situation now under review. But, although
virtually separate, the personal has not yet so found itself.
Thus, in social evolution, this condition shows itself in a blind
individualism, always so assertive of independence of the exist-
ing structure, yet also so helpless without it: but, psycholog-
ically or biologically, how best to describe this virtual yet undis-
covered or unappreciated separation I am at a loss to know.
Certainly it shows the functional self, the vital nature in an
agent, become at least blindly superior to the structural or
morphological self, and it shows, too, whether psychologically
or sociologically, that although nature seems to be on the point
of taking to herself the formal life of man, allowing it to
crumble or rather to assimilate to herself, man nevertheless
really survives, rising in his vitality only to cooperate with her
in the use of his establishments. Technically how the psy-
chologist would wish this moment or situation in development,
perhaps in the development of volition, described, I am quite
unable to guess, and possibly he has no suitable term or phrase
for it, but the situation, I am sure, is a real one. Here, how-
ever, a possible misunderstanding must be avoided. Thus, in
the first place, as indeed already indicated, I am now describ-
ing only a situation and the situation comprises rather a division
of the self in fact or condition, the structural self having become
insensitive or mechanical, than a division of the self in conscious-
ness. To just such a purely factual division the blind fatalism,
or the blind individualism, mentioned before, was clearly an
index. Moreover, in the second place, a division of the self,
whether in bare fact or in consciousness, is rather logical than
psychological or rather social than personal, and this one needs
constantly to remember. Logically there may be two selves,
the vital and the structural, and sociologically also, in so far as
society is viewed abstractly in terms only of so much formal
organization, there may be two selves, the individual and the
citizen, but mere counting is never real seeing. Function and
structure are truly two, but they are not truly two selves.1
1
 A. question certainly worth asking, at least in a note, is here unavoidable
to him that reads between the lines. Is logic, at least formal logic, even such a
logic as Kant's ' transcendental' logic, true rather to experience as expressed.
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So, to gather together what has been said so far, this third
moment, the moment of the practical situation, is the moment of
the human in a sense profaned and turned merely useful; it is
the moment of life wholly without poetry, the once stirring
metaphors being all dead, and subject to the qualification just
made — it is the moment of a factual division of the self, the
structural self still keeping up appearances through a blind
fatalism or a blind individualism and the vital, functional self
being as real and also as unseen or unseeing as the blindness.
And now, for the third time, an objector confronts me with
a question. In reducing the formal structure of human life to
a mere natural floating utility am I not confusing the practical
with the economic? Well, let me concede that so far I have
defined the practical situation in terms which directly suggest
the sort of mechanicalism or hollow conservatism and naturalism
in life that economics demands. Economics characteristically
demands no interference with the • credit of the country,' which
is to say the status in quo, the existing structure or organization,
but its loyalty to the organization is formal, not substantial. It
requires mankind to be both morally and esthetically without
emotion. Its typical man must be just a money making
machine, and what is money but the incarnation of a floating
natural utility. Thus, with its peculiar abstraction, economics
knows only utility, and in the practical situation utility certainly
seems supreme. It is so supreme that any purpose for it is quite
forgotten! Accordingly, as already conceded, the objector is
right; he is right, so far as he goes; and he has, in fact, as
before, only assisted my exposition. But, to repeat the refrain,
a situation is never an attitude, although it always induces one.
For the case in hand, the practical situation induces the reflective
attitude and this saves the situation from its bondage to a mere
formal utility.
socially, which is to say, of course, structurally or formally, than to experience
as personal, vital or functional ? This question, as put, almost begs its own
answer, an affirmative one. Only real logic, in the sense of a logic that,
although recognizing form in experience, treats experience as also imbued with
a vital superiority to its form or structure, as if with a ' legal supremacy,' can
possibly satisfy the demands of what is characteristically personal. Moreover,
in this fact it would seem as if the pragmatist must find the method in the re-
puted madness of his philosophy.
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The reflective, which, as here understood, is also the cogni-
tional attitude, only appreciates or idealizes the actual conditions
of the practical situation. Thus, it takes as something real the
end which the formal utilitarianism, the idle conventionalism of
the practical situation has certainly implied but as certainly
concealed in its blind individual or in its blind fate and just in
recognizing or facing this end it shows the vital, functional self,
on the one hand, become conscious — or seeing — and assertive
independently of mere structure and the structural self, on the
other hand, made positively mediative, that is, mediative of
something quite real although formally external to it or * objec-
tive.' The conscious reality of the vital self and the objective
character of the mediation of the structural self are thus here
considered to be just that which makes the attitude now in ques-
tion reflective or cognitional. For so-called reflection structure
is become only means, instrument or method and it is method to
what is regarded distinctly real but is, in the words used before,
* formally external.' This phrase, let me say further, signifies
(i) formally or structurally indeterminate,1 a character clearly
belonging to whatever is said to be objective, and yet also (2)
real. The reality is not necessarily apart from the structure; it
is so only in form, that is, only relatively ; it may be, nay, I
think it must be actually in the structure, in its very character
as only means or method, just as any true end must be immanent
in, or vital to, the means to it. But as an attitude, reflection
naturally holds the conscious, vital self and the real end to their
formal unlikeness or aloofness and so treats the now insensitive
structure as the medium of what very commonly is known as an
abstract idea, a universal, a principle, or — not to prolong the
list further—a conception, that belongs, not to the world of
sensation or body, but to the world of thought or mind.
So, to recall a mode of statement already employed, a con-
ception, which is the typical ' object' of reflection, while in just
the sense indicated negative only relatively to form or subjective
structure, nevertheless, in so far as negative or outside, can be
merely a logical rather than a psychological datum; although,
'That is, of course, so indeterminate relatively to tbe p siiive structure of
the subject or agent.
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as a matter of course, a psychologist may still be directly inter-
ested in the peculiar conditions that determine the data of the re-
flective attitude as thus amenable to logical treatment. In other
words, psychologically, there can be no independent conception,
and the supposed independence of the conception can spring
only from the standpoint, essentially logical, that would view
the reflective attitude wholly in terms of the dichotomy of what
is formally structural and what is not.1 Moreover, the reflec-
tive attitude itself is the psychological moment for logic, al-
though the very dichotomy, on which it rests, makes the
moment only a passing one, as we shall see.
But, the issues between logic and psychology aside, it is
now apparent, I think, in what important way the dying of the
metaphors in human art or in nature, or the accompanying birth
of an insensitive human structure, or — once more—the devel-
opment of that purely formal or floating natural utility was des-
tined to serve the progress of the general situation and the
solution of the conflict which we found characteristic of it.
The insensitive structure, as if a medium, or more narrowly a
language, without emotion or metaphor, made possible what
somewhat technically is known as strictly scientific research.
It made possible a free, thoroughly candid or open-minded, struc-
turally or humanly unprejudiced study of nature instead of the
more passive and more restrained observation that belonged to
the esthetic attitude. Thus the esthetic attitude showed man
not yet free from himself, although his fear had changed to
awe; it showed him perhaps free in spirit, but not yet free in
letter, not yet really free; whereas the reflective or cognitional
attitude shows him at least very much nearer to a complete
freedom. Has not his structure become a real instrument?
Has he not distinctly found his vital self? Has he not ac-
knowledged an 'objective' nature? The reflective attitude,
then, shows him free, free from — or in? — himself, in just so
far as his no longer sensitive structure has become a mere tool
or method in real use; that is, in the use of his new-found self
as this confronts nature.
1
 Witness the principles of identity and contradiction. Witness, also, the
character of the independent concept as an abstract universal.
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And yet, although there is this advance, it is necessary now
to issue a caution. The reflective attitude must not be under-
stood to involve any mere betrayal of the quondam metaphors;
on the contrary, it is only a fulfilment of them. It cannot
properly or honestly thank the absolute, I mean the general
situation, that it is not as the esthetic attitude was; but, instead,
it must realize that as the tool or structure is put to real use, as
the utility is really invested, the experience which has gone
before, sensitiveness, metaphors and all, is exactly what deter-
mines the momentum and efficiency of the activity. True, the
'objective' nature in the case is deepened beyond any mere
conformity with man, beyond even the licentious conformity of
the esthetic consciousness, but it is still nature, aad the same
nature too, and the metaphors, although all dead, are dead only
as sensitive metaphors, and so to speak as insensitive meta-
phors are still active in the tool or structure. Indeed, however
grandiloquently, I wonder if the method or the medium or the
structurally mediated conception of the reflective attitude may
not be said to be the very metaphors that died with the rise of
the practical situation spiritually resurrected. Conception
would then be definable as a sort of greatly deepened and
spiritualized esthetic experience; an esthetic experience still
dependent on metaphor, but so deepened or possibly so purely
objective as to be, not human, but just natural. Is not the nat-
ural truth, which reflection seeks, I cannot say, which reflection
observes, and which is always the peculiar content of the con-
ception, even more awful or more deeply sublime than natural
beauty? Indeed man, structural man, almost must be declared
to be, not numb, but dead, in the presence of its sublimity.
I have just said ' almost,' and before, in speaking of the free-
dom that comes with reflection I used and emphasized the phrase
' in so far as,' declaring in so many words that the freedom was
not necessarily complete but was proportional to the measure in
which the structure of human life had come into real use. Now
complete use, with that necessary death of the human before
the sublimity of nature, is not possible in reflection. It is true
that reflection is active and that reflection uses the medium or
structure supplied to it, but its use is related to the ideal very
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much as the psychologist tells us attention is related to volition.
It is true, too, that reflection in its own nature somehow demands
the complete use referred to, but reflection, characteristically,
must keep means and end, language and idea, structure and
meaning, at least somewhat apart. Accordingly the reflective
attitude can fulfil itself, can realize its own demands, only by
yielding to a new situation, namely, to the wholly natural
situation, and to this I now turn.
IV. THE NATURAL SITUATION.
Of this fourth and at least for the present study last special
situation I shall write somewhat more briefly, concluding my
paper rather abruptly, as many stories are brought to an end,
and, also as with the stories, at a point where possibly the situa-
tion is getting most deeply interesting and might seem to demand
the longest chapter.
As the foregoing has already indicated, the physical situa-
tion belongs to the moment, not of any surviving conceit of
human sufficiency, not of any slightest remnant of human con-
descension towards nature, and not of any merely formal
naturalism or blind fatalism, but distinctly of the death or loss
of the human structure in the natural. The structural man dies
just in order that the vital and natural man may live or rather
the death of the one is in and with the rising life of the other.
Again, the natural situation is the moment, not of any merely
miserly utilitarianism, but of the human structure become, instead
of an aimless, formal, floating, hoarded utility, a real, positively
natural utility. So, through reflection, has the practical been
changed to the natural situation.
Manifestly the reflective attitude calls for this change. By
its very • self-consciousness,' that makes the human structure
only mediative, by its conviction of the inner or vital self as
well as of the outer nature being at once real and formally ex-
ternal to the structure, and by its own active use of the struc-
tural medium, it calls for just that fatal invasion or overwhelm-
ing assertion of nature which makes the natural situation. In
history as in psychology the reflective attitude is always an in-
vitation to nature to realize herself. It summons, or already it
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has admitted and recognized, what seems barbarian into what
has stood for civilization or what seems impulsive, sensuous and
irrational into the well-controlled and rational, and being such
an invitation or such a cordial recognition it is mainly occupied
with a constant — what shall I say? — a constant offering of its
humanly insensitive, now only mediative structure which pos-
sibly a Teufelsdrockh would call man's cast off clothing, to
nature, the world of its ' objective' curiosity. So Alexander,
pupil of Aristotle, sought to clothe the peoples of the eastern
Mediterranean, and so the reflective life psychologically, as
well as historically, would clothe the not less invaded than in-
vading world of sense. The general process is often known as
assimilation, more or less benevolent, often as experimentation,
but under either name it shows nature trying on the human and
it is conducted under the guidance of the dead, in the sense of
the dehumanized metaphors of the esthetic consciousness. Per-
haps these metaphors become wholly insensitive, should rather
be called analogies, even objective analogies, as is suggested
by the fact that the experimentation, or the assimilation, strives
to use them the nature-end forward, not as with the esthetic
attitude, the man-end forward. But certainly they guide the
process and testify accordingly to the honesty of the invitation
to nature or to the cordiality of the recognition of her, and in
the natural situation one sees, again, that nature has only taken
reflection at its word.
Nature takes reflection at its word with a new structure, a
new organization. The content of this new organization and
its form are determined, moreover, by the bounds of the inducing
activity, or of what might also be called the functional capacity
or versatility of the passing structure, and by the analogies that
have constantly guided it. Simply, if there be definite structure
at the start, and just this, as will be remembered, was the start-
ing point for the present study, then also that stucture is, propor-
tionally to its structural definiteness^ limited to a certain sphere
of activity, or functional character, and the bounds of this sphere
measure the extent of the new organization, while the inevitable
analogies developed with its exploitation determine the new
form. Structure, the definite, can of course be only ' relative,'
52 ALFRED H. LLOYD.
but being relative it must be complex and being complex it must
be functional as well as structural, and being functional it must
induce, through such moments as have been recounted here, new
structure; new, because the original structure was relative and
functional, and structure, because the definite can induce only
the definite. Must not what is new be always true to its origin?
But, without further description or explanation of the natural
situation, an objector must now be met; perhaps the same, who
appeared before, although he gave no name. Thus, this time I
am charged with having confused the natural with the physical.
The spiritual attitude, however, for so I have to call it, although
also it may be called volitional or even religious, is what I would
now depend on to save the natural from being just physical.
This fourth attitude arises in the following way. It is but an
appreciation of the fact, suggested early in my narrative, that
the natural must be also the characteristically personal. Natural
and personal were said to be both external to, or in conflict with,
the formal or structural. Moreover in the reflective process of
experimentation must not that trying-on be as truly on the part
of the inner vital self, as if the waiting will, as on the part of
the outer and • objective' — or physical ? — nature ? How often
it has been pointed out that the natural was objective and could
be objective only in the way of being, not essentially, but
merely formally or structurally external to the human. Nature,
then, truly is physical only in so far as she is ' objective.' Ex-
ternal to the functional or vital in what is human she cannot
be, and this being true, in just so far, she is spiritual; in just
so far her reconstruction is man's volition; in just so far man
says, religiously, of her activity: • Whai she does, I will.' She
may never appear literally in man's image, but her life is one
with his life and the spiritual or volitional or characteristically
religious attitude puts just this valuation upon her.
So this paper having accomplished its specific task must
come to an end. Of course, as from any narrative, a score or
more of ' morals' might be drawn. The distinction, moral or
ethical, between good and evil, for example, evidently should
be judged relatively to the specific situation or to the induced
attitude, within which it manifestly belongs, and the distinction,
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practical or reflective, between truth and error, relatively to
what is a qualitatively different situation or attitude. Again the
need, whenever discussion or explanation would become at all
searching or vital, of always carefully distinguishing between
the personal and the social, the functional and the structural,
perhaps too the pragmatic and the dogmatic, and at the same
time also of always making these distinct things work together
is also evident. But such ' morals,' however urgent or numer-
ous, may be left safely to the imagination.1
lThe MS. of this article waa received December 16, 1906.—ED.
